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Abstract 
In this paper we study whether policy makers should wait to intervene until a financial crisis strikes or 
rather act in a preemptive manner. We study this question in a relatively simple dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium model in which crises are endogenous events induced by the presence of an 
occasionally binding borrowing constraint as in Mendoza (2010). First, we show that the same set of 
taxes that replicates the constrained social planner allocation could be used optimally by a Ramsey 
planner to achieve the first best unconstrained equilibrium: in both cases without any precautionary 
intervention. Second, we show that the extent to which policymakers should intervene in a preemptive 
manner depends critically on the set of policy tools available and what these instruments can achieve 
when a crisis strikes. For example, in the context of our model, we find that, if the policy tools is 
constrained so that the first best cannot be achieved and  the policy make  r has access to only one tax 
instrument, it is always desirable to intervene before the crisis regardless of the instrument used. If 
however the policy maker has access to two instruments, it is optimal to act only during crisis times. 
Third and finally, we propose a computational algorithm to solve Markov-Perfect optimal policy for 
problems in which the policy function is not differentiable. 
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1 Introduction
The global nancial crisis and ensuing great recession of 2007-2009 have started a debate on
the role of policy for the stability of the nancial system and hence the economy as a whole
(i.e., macro-nancial stability). This debate in advanced economies revolves around the role
of macroeconomic and regulatory policies in causing the global crisis and how the conduct
of such policies should be designed in the future to prevent a recurrence of such events. In
emerging economies, the resurgence of strong capital inows from advanced economies has
also focused the discussion on the role of such policies in ensuring the nancial stability of
these countries in the face of highly volatile capital ows.
A key question in this debate is whether policy makers should wait until a crisis strikes to
intervene or rather act during normal times in a precautionary or preemptive manner. While
a seemingly overwhelming consensus has emerged that preemptive intervention would have
been desirable (e.g., Bianchi, 2011; Bianchi and Mendoza, 2010; Jeanne and Korinek, 2011),
investigation of this important policy question has thus far been hampered by the absence
of computational tools to address it. Indeed, optimal policy in models a la Mendoza (2010)
has not been studied yet because the decision rules in that framework are not di¤erentiable,
and available computational methods do not apply. The normative analysis this class of
models therefore is usually conducted by comparing the competitive equilibrium with the
constrained social planner allocation, with the planner facing the same credit friction as
private agents do. Policy is then designed by seeking a set of policy rules that decentralizes
the planner allocation.
In this paper we study the question above in a relatively simple dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model with credit frictions a la Mendoza (2010) in which normal times
alternate with crisis times endogenously. More specically, there are three main contribu-
tions of our work.
First, we show that the same set of taxes that replicates the constrained social planner
allocation could be used by a Ramsey planner to achieve the rst best unconstrained equi-
librium. In both cases there is no need to rely on preempitve intervention. This suggests
that when the policy maker has the right set of tools to deal with the nancial crisis, there is
no need of any precautionary intervention. This also shows that, a Ramsey optimal policy
approach is more reliable than the social planner approach currently used in the literature
because it attains all the welfare gains that are within reach of the policy instruments
selected.
Second, we show that the extent to which policymakers should intervene in a preemptive
manner depends critically on the set of policy tools available. Specically, in light of
the results above, we then study numerically more general policy problems in which the
government has a restricted set of tools and cannot achieve the rst best and chooses
taxes optimally in a time-consistent (i.e., Markov-Perfect) equilibrium. For example, in the
numerical analysis of our model, we nd that, if the policy maker has access to only one tax
instrument, it is always desirable to intervene before the crisis regardless of the instrument
used. If however the policy maker has access to two instruments, it is optimal to act only
during crisis times. In the rst case the policymaker has an ine¤ective set of tools to manage
the crisis so that it is optimal to try and prevent the crisis from occurring by acting in a
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prudential manner. In the second case, the policymaker can use one instrument to address
the crisis when one occurs to its full potential and the second instrument to contain the side
e¤ects of such interventions. The key insight of this second contribution of our work is that
the optimal design of the policy intervention before a nancial crisis strikes depends on the
e¤ectiveness of the policy tools during the nancial crisis. In other words, the interaction
between ex-post (crisis times) and ex-ante (normal times) policy behavior is a crucial aspect
of the policy design problem: the ex-ante optimal policy intervention depends on the policy
design during crises times.
Third and nally, since in this environment available solution methods do not apply,
we contribute to the literature from a methodological perspective, by developing a com-
putational algorithms that solves for the global optimal Markov-Perfect equilibrium of the
economy. To our knowledge this is the rst paper that computes optimal policy in the
context of dynamic general equilibrium model with occasionally binding credit constraint.1
The model we use to address this issue is now fairly standard for the study of macro-
nancial stability. This is an economy in which there are both crisis and non-crisis states, in
which a crisis event is an endogenous outcome (e.g., Mendoza, 2010). In this environment,
nancial crises are events in which a nancial friction (e.g., an international borrowing
constraint) becomes binding endogenously, depending on agentschoices, the state of the
economy, and policy decisions as well. When the constraint does not bind the model econ-
omy exhibits normal business cycle uctuations. Specically, our endogenous borrowing
credit constraint is embedded in a standard two-sector (tradable and non-tradable goods)
small open economy in which foreign borrowing is denominated in units of the tradable
good, but it is leveraged on income generated in both sectors.2 Thus, the relative price
of non-tradeable good a¤ects the value of non tradable income. This is a specication of
the borrowing constraint that captures liability dollarizationa key feature of the capi-
tal structure of emerging markets (e.g., Krugman (1999), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee
(2004)).3
The competitive equilibrium of this economy is not e¢ cient because of the presence of
the relative price of non-tradable goods in the borrowing constraint. This ine¢ ciency is usu-
ally referred to as a pecuniary externality (or as price or credit externality) in the literature:
individual agents take prices as given and do not internalize the e¤ect of their individual
decisions on the market price that enters the specication of the nancial friction.4
As we noted above, in the existing literature, scope for policy intervention is identied
by comparing the competitive equilibrium with the social planner allocation in which the
planner is subject to the same collateral constraint but takes into account the e¤ects of
its actions on equilibrium prices. The policy analysis is then conducted by choosing the
policy instruments that implement the e¢ cient allocation (e.g., see for instance Bianchi
1On optimal policy in models in which the economy is in a nancial crisis see Braggion, Christiano,
Roldos (2009), Caballero and Panageas (2007), Cúrdia (2007), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2005), Hevia
(2008), among others.
2See for example Mendoza (2002) and Bianchi (2011).
3The latest wave of crises in Europe is striking evidence of the importance of such feature.
4For details see Bianchi (2011), Bianchi and Mendoza (2010), Caballero and Lorenzoni (2008), Chang,
Cespedes, and Velasco (2012), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), and Lorenzoni (2008)) who analyze the same
kind of externality.
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(2011) on debt taxes or capital controls). The social planner approach provides a useful
normative benchmark, but it does not allow for interaction between the policy maker and the
private sector, thus omitting a fundamental aspect of typical macroeconomic stabilization
problems e.g., Kydland and Prescott (1977). In broad terms, the key contribution of this
paper is to allow for this interaction in the analysis of one of the most important questions
in the ongoing policy debate.
In this paper, in contrast, we determine an optimal policy equilibrium for an economy
that is subject to an occasionally binding collateral constraint. We do that in the context
of a Markov-Perfect (or "time-consistent") equilibrium since the presence of the borrowing
constraint creates an incentive for the policy maker to deviate from past promises when the
constraint is binding. As Chari and Kehoe (2010) noted, this is a more realistic assumption
than "commitment". Therefore our approach is more closely related to the problem faced
by actual governments that are unable to commit in advance to a given set of bail out
policies.
To solve for optimal policy in this model we develop a global solution method. That is,
we solve for a policy rule across both states of the world, when the constraint binds and when
it does not. Such an approach enforces that optimal policy rule away from the crisis periods
is designed with full knowledge of what the rule will be when the economy enters a crisis
state. This is true for both the policy maker and the agents in the economy. This solution
method, while computationally costly, is critical for understanding the interaction between
precautionary behavior on the part of the private sector with precautionary behavior on
the part of the policy maker. The technical challenge in solving such a model is that the
constraint binds only occasionally, and the policy functions are not di¤erentiable. Existing
methods (e.g., Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull, 2009) do not apply under this assumption.
We consider several tax instruments in our analysis. In the numerical analysis we focus
on a distortionary tax on non-traded consumption that can be interpreted in terms of
exchange rate policy (or more generally as a price support policy) and a tax on debt that
can be interpreted as a control on capital ows. We also consider alternative tax tools such
as a tax on tradable consumption, a tax on labor income, a tax on rm prots, as well as
alternative combinations of these instruments to illustrate the robustness of the results.
We rst derive the constrained-e¢ cient allocation that is usually used in the current
literature as a normative benchmark. Then we show how a tax on tradable consumption
and a tax on non-tradable rms prots used only when the constraint binds can be used to
decentralize it (i.e. we show that there is no need for precautionary policy to replicate the
constrained e¢ cient allocation). In fact when the constraint binds, private agents cannot
borrow the desired amount, and since movements in the relative price of non-tradable
are ine¢ cient, resources are not allocated e¢ ciently between the two sectors. The tax
on tradable consumption mitigates the e¤ect of the pecuniary externality on borrowing
decisions and the tax on non-tradable prots reallocate resources properly.
The problem in following the constrained social planner approach to policy design is
that the use of the distortionary tax tool is not optimized. Indeed, we show that the same
set of policy tools could be used optimally by a Ramsey planner to achieve the rst best un-
constrained equilibrium. In this case, the tax on tradable consumption supports the relative
price of non tradable in such a way that the borrowing constraint never binds in equilibrium,
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while the tax on non-rm prots ensures that resource allocation is not distorted. In the
unconstrained equilibrium the commitment to intervene removes the constraints and the
optimal tax scheme is never used in equilibrium. Moreover, as these promised interventions
are time-consistent, the Ramsey planners commitment is fully credible. In contrast, the
implementation of the social planner allocation with the same set of taxes requires that they
would be used when the constraint binds, which may raise feasibility issues. Based on these
results, and in light of the fact that Ramsey optimal policy is generally not time-consistent,
we advocate the use of a Markov-Perfect optimal policy approach to the normative analysis
of this class of models. In practice, given the set of policy instrument selected, it is useful
to follow an approach to policy design that can attains all the welfare gains that are within
their reach.
We then compute numerically the optimal time-consistent policy for given sets of tax
instruments. When we allow for two policy tools (a tax on non-tradable consumption and
the tax on new debt) there is no need to intervene in normal times as the combined used
of the two taxes allows to mitigate the costs of using distortionary taxation in crises times.
In contrast, when we allow for only one policy tool, (a tax on non-tradable consumption or
a tax on debt) the policy maker cannot limit the costs of using distortionary policy tools
in crises times and as such intervenes in normal times to limit their occurrence. We nd
that similar results hold for the tax on tradable consumption and the tax on wages.
This paper is related to the recent strand of literature that has built on the seminal work
by Mendoza (2010) and has studied the normative properties in model economies subject
to sudden stops. Bianchi (2011) uses an endowment version of our economy and nds that
without production the competitive equilibrium always entails more borrowing relative to
the social planner allocation, and that a prudential capital control (i.e., a prudential tax on
borrowing) can replicate the social planner allocation. Benigno et al (2012) show that in a
production economy the extent to which private agents borrow too little or too much depend
on parameter values, but they dont discuss issues related to the implementation of the
constrained e¢ cient allocation. Benigno et al (2012b) compare alternative tax instruments
in the same economy analyzed by Bianchi (2011) and nd that taxes on consumption
(i.e., real exchange rate interventions) dominate capital controls as a policy tool because
they can achieve the rst best while capital controls can achieve only the second best.
Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2012) compare the transmission mechanism of alternative
policy interventions in a model with an occasionally binding nancial friction, but dont
discuss the implementation of the constrained e¢ cient allocation or the computation of
optimal policy in tier set up. Jeanne and Korinek (2011) and Bianchi and Mendoza (2010)
analyze models in which the price externality arises because agents fail to internalize the
e¤ect of their decisions on an asset price rather than the relative price of non-tradable
goods like in our model and compare competitive equilibrium with the constrained social
planner allocation. Their policy implications are similar to those of Bianchi (2011). While
computing optimal policy in models with asset-price entering the borrowing constraint
presents additional computational challenges, the general lessons for policy design of our
analysis apply also to those set ups.
To our knowledge, there are no contributions in the literature on the analysis of optimal
policy in an environment in which a borrowing constraint both binds occasionally and
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is endogenous to the decisions in the model. Adams and Billi (2006a and 2006b) study
optimal monetary policy in a closed economy, new Keynesian model in which there is zero
lower bound on interest rates that binds only occasionally. Their zero-bound constraint
is xed and does not evolve endogenously. In terms of solution technique for the optimal
policy problem we set up, our method is related to Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2009):
the main di¤erence is that our algorithm does not require that the policy functions are
di¤erentiable (which in general would not hold in our environment due to the occasionally-
binding constraint) but only that they are continuous.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model we use and
its competitive equilibrium. Section 3 derives a set of normative results analytically. In par-
ticular, it derives the social planner allocation and the rst best unconstrained equilibrium
of the model and discusses how to decentralize them via tax policy interventions. Section
4 dene the equilibria that we compute numerically and describes the solution methods we
propose, and discusses some properties of the tax instruments we consider that are useful
to interpret the numerical results. Section 5 discusses the parametrization of the model.
Section 6 studies optimal policy numerically in our model environment. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model and the Competitive Equilibrium
In this section, we describe our model set-up. The model that we use is a relatively simple,
two-sector (tradable and non-tradable) production small open economy, in which nancial
markets are not only incomplete but also imperfect as in Mendoza (2010) and Benigno et
al (2012). In what follows we describe the competitive equilibrium allocation with the set
of taxes that we are going to use in our normative analysis.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households j 2 [0; 1] that maximize the utility function
U j  E0
1X
t=0
8<:t 11  
 
Cj;t  
Hj;t

!1 9=; ; (1)
with Cj denoting the individual consumption basket and Hj the individual supply of labor
for the tradable and non-tradable sectors (Hj = HTj + H
N
j ). The assumption of perfect
substitutability between labor services in the two sectors ensures that there is a unique
labor market. For simplicity we omit the j subscript for the remainder of this section,
but it is understood that all choices are made at the individual level. The elasticity of
labor supply is , while  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. In (1), the preference
specication follows from Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (GHH, 1988).5
5In the context of a one-good economy this specication eliminates the wealth e¤ect from the labor
supply choice. Here we emphasize that in a multi-good economy, the sectoral allocation of consumption
will a¤ect the labor supply decision through relative prices (See Benigno et al., 2012 for more details).
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The consumption basket, Ct, is a composite of tradable and non-tradable goods:
Ct 
h
!
1

 
CTt
 1
 + (1  !) 1  CNt  1 i  1 : (2)
The parameter  is the elasticity of intratemporal substitution between consumption of
tradable and nontradable goods, while ! is the relative weight of tradable goods in the
consumption basket. We normalize the price of tradable goods to 1. The relative price of
the nontradable goods is denoted by PN . The aggregate price index is then given by
Pt =
h
! + (1  !)  PNt 1 i 11  ;
where we note that there is a one-to-one link between the aggregate price index P and the
relative price PN :
Households maximize utility subject to their budget constraint, which is expressed in
units of tradable consumption. The constraint each household faces is:
(1 + Tt )C
T
t + (1 + 
N
t )P
N
t C
N
t = t +WtHt   TCt   (1  Bt )Bt+1 + (1 + i)Bt; (3)
where Wt is the wage in units of tradable goods, Bt+1 < 0 denotes the debt position at the
end of period t with gross real return 1+ i. Households receive prots, t, from owning the
representative rm. Their labor income is given by WtHt. We denote with Bt > 0(< 0) a
tax (subsidy) on the amount that households borrows, with Nt ; 
T
t > 0(< 0) a tax (subsidy)
on non-tradeable and tradeable consumption respectively, and with TCt > 0(< 0) lump-sum
taxes (transfers) to the consumer.6
International nancial markets are incomplete, and access to them is imperfect. The
asset menu includes only a one-period bond denominated in units of tradable consumption.
In addition, we assume that the amount that each individual can borrow internationally is
limited by a fraction of his current total income:
Bt+1   1  

[t +WtHt] : (4)
Note rst that the value of the collateral is endogenous in this model and it depends on
the current realization of prot and wage income. And a necessary condition for dening a
crisis event in the context of this class of models is to have the constraint binding. Second
note that this constraint captures a balance sheet e¤ect (e.g., Krugman, 1999, and Aghion,
Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2004) since foreign borrowing is denominated in units of tradables
while the income that can be pledged as collateral is generated also in the non-tradable
sector.
Following the related literature on pecuniary externalities and prudential policies, we
do not explicitly derive the credit constraint as the outcome of an optimal contract between
lenders and borrowers. However, we can interpret the constraint above as the outcome of
an interaction between lenders and borrowers in which lenders are not willing to permit
6Although at this stage we do not explicitly set up taxes on wage income, in the numerical analysis we
will consider also this possibility.
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borrowing beyond a certain limit. This limit depends on the parameter , which measures
the tightness of the nancial friction, and on current income that could be used as a proxy
of future income.7 At the empirical level, a specication in terms of current income is
consistent with evidence on the determinants of access to credit markets (e.g., Jappelli
1990) and lending criteria and guidelines used in mortgage and consumer nancing.8
Households maximize (1) subject to (3) and (4) by choosing CNt ; C
T
t , Bt+1, and Ht. The
rst-order conditions of this problem are the following:
CT :
 
Cj;t  
Hj;t

! 
!
1

 
CTt
  1
 C
1
 = t(1 + 
T
t ) (5)
CN :
 
Cj;t  
Hj;t

! 
(1  !) 1  CNt   1 C 1 = tPNt (1 + Nt ) (6)
Bt+1 : (1  Bt )CEt = CEt +  (1 + i)Et

CEt+1

; (7)
and
Ht :
 
Cj;t  
Hj;t

!   
H 1j;t

= CEt Wt +
1  

Wt
CE
t : (8)
where t is the multiplier on the period budget constraint, and 
CE
t is the multiplier on
the international borrowing constraint. The presence of the borrowing constraint distorts
directly two margins: the intertemporal margin, as the Euler equation (7) includes a term
(CEt > 0) when the constraint binds, and the labor supply choice (8) since when the
constraint binds agents are willing to supply additional units of labor.
We can combine (5) and (6) to obtain the intratemporal allocation of consumption, and
(5) with (8) to obtain the labor supply schedule, and summarize the rst order conditions
of the household as:
(1 + Nt )P
N
t
(1 + Tt )
=
(1  !) 1  CNt   1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1

(9)
 
H 1j;t

=

!C
CT
 1

Wt

1 +
1  

CEt
CEt

; (10)
It is important to note here that Nt and 
T
t a¤ect the determination of the relative price
directly. For example, for given consumption of tradeable and non-tradeable, a decrease of in
Nt implies an increase in the relative price of non-tradeable goods and hence a higher value
of the collateral in units of tradable consumption. On the other hand, the channel through
7A constraint expressed in terms of future income, which could be the outcome of the interaction be-
tween lenders and borrowers in a limited commitment environment, would introduce further computational
di¢ culties that we need to avoid for tractability since future consumption choices would a¤ect current
borrowing decisions.
8The substance of our normative results will not change if we modify the borrowing constraint to include
a working capital component that will have more realistic implications in terms of business cycle moments
and nancial crisis dynamics. To keep the normative analysis as simple as possible we abstract from this
component here.
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which B works, depends on the constraint being binding or not. When the constraint is
not binding, B reduces the amount that agents borrow. When the constraint binds, since
the amount of borrowing is determined by the endogenous limit, B a¤ects the value of the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint, CEt : This can be seen by re-arranging
the rst order condition for debt as:
CEt = (1  Bt )CEt    (1 + i)Et

CEt+1

> 0:
For example, for given future marginal utility of tradeable consumption (Et

CEt+1

), an
increase in Bt will tend to decrease the value of the multiplier, 
CE
t and the amount of
labor that is supplied in crisis times for given real wages (10).
The tax on tradable consumption, Tt , works similarly to the tax on nontradable con-
sumption; the main di¤erence is that, in general, changes in the tax rate between two
periods a¤ect the intertemporal path of consumption of tradables. As we shall see, how-
ever, in the Markov-Perfect equilibrium that we compute numerically these two taxes (the
one on tradable consumption and the one on nontradable consumption) have equivalent
implications.
2.2 Firms
Firms produce tradable and non-tradable goods with a variable labor input and the follow-
ing decreasing return to scale technologies:
Y Nt = A
N
t H
1 N
t ;
Y Tt = A
T
t H
1 T
t ;
where AN and AT are the productivity levels, which are assumed to be random variables,
in the non-tradable and tradable sector, respectively. The rms problem is static and
current-period prots (t) are:
t = A
T
t
 
HTt
1 T
+ (1  Dt )PNt ANt
 
HNt
1 N  WtHt   TDt :
In some cases, we shall allow for distortionary taxation (subsidy) on non-tradeable rms
revenue, Dt > 0 (< 0) and we allow for lump-sum taxes or transfer to the rm T
D
t , so that
the rst-order conditions for labor demand in the two sectors are given by:
Wt = (1  Dt )
 
1  NPNt ANt  HNt  N ; (11)
Wt =
 
1  T ATt  HTt  T ; (12)
and the value of the marginal product of labor equals the wage in units of tradable goods
(Wt). By taking the ratio of (11) over (12) we obtain:
PNt =
 
1  T ATt  HTt  T
(1  Dt ) (1  N)ANt (HNt ) 
N : (13)
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From this last expression we can see that the relative price of non-tradable goods determines
the allocation of labor between the two sectors: for given productivity levels, a decrease
(increase) in PNt drives down (up) the marginal product of non-tradables and induces a
shift of labor toward (out of) the tradable sector. Similarly an increase in Dt tends to shift
labor out of the tradable sector towards the non-tradable one.
2.3 Government Budget Constraint
The government follows a balanced budget rule and has access to lump-sum transfer or
taxes:
Bt Bt+1 + 
N
t P
N
t C
N
t + 
D
t P
N
t Y
N
t = T
C
t + T
D
t :
Note that in this class of models, in which the pecuniary externality make the competitive
equilibrium ine¢ cient, the presence of lump-sum taxes or transfer simplies the policy
problem without making it trivial: in particular, as we will see later, access to lump-sum
taxes does not guarantee that the equilibrium will be time-consistent.
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
To determine the goods market equilibrium, combine the household budget constraint, the
government budget constraint and the rms prots with the equilibrium condition in the
nontradable good market to obtain the current account equation of our small open economy:
CTt = A
T
t H
1 T
t  Bt+1 + (1 + i)Bt: (14)
The nontradable goods market equilibrium condition implies that
CNt = Y
N
t = A
N
t
 
HNt
1 N
: (15)
Finally, using the denitions of rmsprots and wages, the credit constraint implies that
the amount that the country, as a whole, can borrow is constrained by a fraction of the
value of its GDP:
Bt+1   1  


Y Tt + (1  Dt )PNt Y Nt   TDt

; (16)
so that (14) and (16) determines the evolution of the foreign borrowing.
The competitive equilibrium allocation is then characterized by (14), (16), (15) along
with the rst order conditions for the household (5), (7), (9) and (10), and rms (13) and
the complementary slackness condition:9
Bt+1 +
1  


Y Tt + (1  Dt )PNt Y Nt   TDt

CEt = 0 with 
CE
t > 0:
9The properties of the competitive equilibrium of this economy are well known (See for instance Mendoza,
2002 and Benigno et al. 2012).
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3 Normative Analysis: Constrained Social Planner
and First Best
In this section we derive a few normative results analytically. These results provide useful
benchmarks for the numerical optimal policy analysis we report below and are important
in their own right. In particular, we rst dene the social planner (SP) equilibrium and
discuss its implementation with a given set of instruments. We then show that the same
set of instruments that implement the SP can achieve the rst best when used optimally
by a Ramsey planner.
3.1 The Social Planner Problem and Its Implementation
We rst turn to the characterization of the social planner allocation and its implementation.
This allocation is typically used as a benchmark for policy design in this class of models.
Our planner problem is constrained in the sense that the she/he faces the same borrowing
constraint that the private agents do, but from an aggregate country-wide perspective.
We shall also emphasize here, for clarity, that the social planner does not set any tax
instrument, but simply allocates resources directly. In fact, the planner chooses the optimal
path of CTt ; C
N
t ; Bt+1, H
T
t and H
N
t by maximizing (1) subject to the resource constraints
(14) and (15), the international borrowing constraint from an aggregate perspective ((16)
with taxes equal to zero), and the pricing rule of the competitive equilibrium allocation
(9) in which N = T = 0. Therefore, the key di¤erence between the two allocations
(competitive and social planner ones) is that the planner takes into account the e¤ects of
its decision of prices and hence internalizes the pecuniary externality that is present in the
model.
How we determine the relative price that enters the nancial friction (in our case PNt )
in the social planner allocation can a¤ect the policy analysis signicantly. By constraining
the social planner problem with the pricing rule of the competitive equilibrium we follow
the constrained e¢ ciency denition of Kehoe and Levine (1993). An alternative way
that has been used in the related literature (Bianchi (2011), Bianchi and Mendoza (2011))
is to adopt the concept of conditional e¢ ciency from Kehoe and Levine (1993). With
conditional e¢ ciency the planner problem is constrained by the competitive equilibrium
pricing function (i.e., PNt = f
CE(Bt; A
N
t ; A
T
t )), in which f
CE is the policy function for PNt
obtained from solving the competitive equilibrium allocation.
This second alternative has been adopted in the literature mainly for computational
reasons in models in which the key market price is a forward-looking variable like an asset
price (see Benigno et al 2012b for more details). It is evident that with the second alter-
native, by construction, equilibrium prices in the competitive and social planner allocation
are identical for a given set of exogenous and endogenous states. As a result, the scope
for divergence between the two allocations is limited by construction, and the states of the
world in which the constraint binds are almost e¢ cientby denition: i.e., nancial crises
become e¢ cient outcomes. To avoid this crucial pitfall, we use constrained rather than
conditional e¢ ciency. Constrained e¢ ciency is also consistent with a standard Ramsey
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approach to optimal taxation.10
Since in the social planner problem there are no taxes or subsidies, we rewrite (16) as
Bt+1 >  1  

"
ATt
 
HTt
1 T
+
(1  !) 1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1


ANt
 
HNt
1 N1  1#
: (17)
We can then obtain the rst-order conditions for the planners problem as
CT :
 
Cj;t  
Hj;t

! 
!C
CT
 1

= SP1;t + (18)
 
SP
t

1  

(1  !)
!
 
(1  !)  CTt 
!
! 1 
 
ANt
 
HNt
1 N 1
;
CN :
 
Cj;t  
Hj;t

! 
(1  !) 1  CNt   1 C 1 = SP2;t ; (19)
Bt+1 : 
SP
1;t = 
SP
t +  (1 + i)Et

SP1;t+1

; (20)
HTt :

Ct   H

t

   
H 1t

=
 
1  T SP1;t ATt H Tt + 1   SPt  1  T ATt H Tt ; (21)
and
HNt :

Ct   H

t

   
H 1t

=
 
1  NSP2;t At  HNt  N (22)
+
1  

SPt
(1  !) 1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1

  1

 
1  N  ANt  1  HNt (1 N) 1  1 ;
where SP1;t is the Lagrange multiplier on (14), 
SP
2;t is the Lagrange multiplier on (15) and
SPt is the multiplier on (17).
An extensive discussion on the comparison between the FOCs in the CE and the SP
of this model can be found in Benigno et al. (2012). Here we note only that in equation
(18), in choosing tradable consumption, the planner takes into account the e¤ects that this
choice has on the value of the collateral. This e¤ect is usually referred to as pecuniary
externality.
We now discuss how to implement the social planner allocation in a decentralized equi-
librium. The following proposition holds.
Proposition 1. Given the set of available tax policy tools (B; N ; T ; D; TD; TC), there
exists a combination of policy rules for (T ; D; TD; TC) (a tax scheme for brevity) that can
implement the social planner equilibrium of our production economy. These policy rules are
time consistent.
10Adopting one criterion versus the other also a¤ects the normative analysis in terms of implementation
of the social planner problem, as the combination of taxes and transfers that implements the social planner
allocation di¤er depending on the denition of e¢ ciency adopted.
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In order to implement the social planner equilibrium we compare the rst order condi-
tions of the two allocations and seek policy rules for our tools that equalize them. Note
rst that we can correct the distortion in the marginal utility of tradable consumption by
using the tax on tradable goods: in fact by comparing (18) with (5) we have that
 
1 + Tt
SP
=
0@1  SPt
SP1;t 
1  

(1  !)
!
 
(1  !)  CTt 
!CN
! 1 
 
ANt
 
HNt
1 N 1 1A < 1;
where the right hand side is evaluated at the social planner allocation, and the policy
intervention subsidizes the consumption of tradable goods. Second, by setting T =
 
T
SP
and N = 0 into (9) we obtain that the intratemporal allocation of consumption in the
social planner allocation (the ratio of (18) over (19)) is also implemented. Third, note
that the intertemporal allocation of consumption has the same expression for both the
planner (equation (20)) and the competitive equilibrium (equation (7)) once we set Bt = 0.
So there is no need to set a tax on international borrowing to implementation the social
planner equilibrium in our economy. Fourth, note that the intratemporal allocation of labor
is modied in the planner problem. In fact from (21) and (22), we have that:
SP2;t
SP1;t
=
 
1  T ATt  HTt  T
(1  N)ANt (HNt ) 
N

1 + 1 

SPt
SP1;t

 
1 + 1 

SPt
SP2;t
(1 !) 1 (CNt )
  1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1
 1

! ;
which governs how labor is allocated between the tradables and nontradables sectors. The
corresponding condition in the competitive allocation is
PNt =
 
1  T ATt  HTt  T
(1  D) (1  N)ANt (HNt ) 
N :
It follows that, Dt can be used to equalize this margin between the two allocations by
setting D such that
1
(1  D)SP =

1 + 1 

SPt
SP1;t

 
1 + 1 

SPt
SP2;t
(1 !) 1 (CNt )
  1
!
1
 (CTt )
  1
 1

!
where 1
(1 D)SP < 1(> 1) depending on the elasticity of intratemporal substitution  > 1(<
1):
Note nally that when we use
 
D
SP
and
 
T
SP
as described above, we will have
that, when the constraint binds, it will be a¤ected by the tax scheme in the decentralized
equilibrium. In fact we can rewrite the borrowing constraint in the decentralized equilibrium
as
Bt+1 =  1  

h
Y Tt + (1 
 
Dt
SP
)PNt Y
N
t   TDt
i
14
with
PNt
(1 + (T )SP )
=

1  !
!
CTt
CNt
 1

:
In general, the expression for the borrowing constraint will di¤er between the competi-
tive and the social planner allocation because of the presence of taxes in the competitive
equilibrium one. So we need to nd the a combination of taxes such that
Bt+1 =  1  

h
Y Tt +
 
PNt
SP
Y Nt
i
:
To do so, denote with
 
PNt
SP
the relative price of non-tradable in the social planner
allocation:  
PNt
SP
=

1  !
!
CTt
CNt
 1

:
so that  
PNt
SP
(1 +
 
T
SP
) = PNt
evaluating the price at the same (SP) allocation. This means that we can set TDt in the
competitive equilibrium allocation such that 
TDt
SP
=    Dt SP (1 +  T SP )  PNt SP Y Nt :
So the triplet
 
N ; T ; TD
SP
with TC satisfying the government budget constraint will be
su¢ cient to replicate the SP allocation when the constraint binds.
When the constraint does not bind, it is easy to see by inspection that the rst order
conditions of the social planner and the competitive equilibrium are the same so that there
is no need to use any tax tools.
The social planner problem above is recursive. Therefore the tax scheme that imple-
ments it in a decentralized equilibrium is time-consistent. QED.
To understand the intuition behind the implementation of the social planner equilibrium,
it is important to note that this planner is constrained by the international borrowing
constraint i.e., he takes the constraint as given. Thus, the planner makes consumption
and labor decisions with the aim of limiting the consequences of the constraint. Essentially,
the social planner takes into account the e¤ect of the pecuniary externality on the marginal
utility of tradable consumption and on the reallocation of labor across sectors. When the
constraint binds, private agents consume less tradable consumption than the social planner
so that in order to restore e¢ ciency the planner subsidizes tradable consumption. When the
constraint binds, the planner also allocates sectoral labor depending on the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution . If tradables and nontradables consumption are complements
( < 1) then the implementation of the social planner problem requires to set D > 0, i.e. to
tax the revenues from non-tradable production to shift production towards tradable goods
relative to the competitive equilibrium. By doing this, the planner limits the consequences
of the binding constraint by increasing the relative price of non-tradables. In contrast, in
the competitive equilibrium, private agents will just increase total labor supply without
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taking into account the e¤ect of the pecuniary externality on the allocation of resources
within sectors.
Three remarks are in order here. First, as Figure A1 in the appendix shows, the set of
policy rules that implement the social planner allocation of our economy is a set of ex post
interventions that do not include any tax on borrowing or any ex ante intervention. Despite
the fact that the set of policy rules that implement the social planner allocation entails
interventions only in crisis times when the borrowing constraint binds, the SP allocation
and the CE allocation di¤ers also in normal times: this di¤erence arises because ex ante
behavior takes into account ex post intervention; an intuition that, as we shall see, carry
over to our numerical optimal policy results below.
Second, this tax scheme is not unique. In fact it is possible to design an alternative
tax policy scheme with no lump-sum transfers or lump-sum taxes that also implements the
social planner allocation (shown in the appendix). In both cases though we note that there
is no need to adopt a policy of capital controls (B = 0) or ex ante policy interventions.
Third, as we noted, the social planner problem is recursive and the triplet
 
N ; T ; TD
SP
that decentralizes the allocation is time-consistent. Therefore, the tax scheme that imple-
ments the social planner allocation therefore is a set of time consistent intervention in crises
times (i.e. when the borrowing constraint binds).
3.2 The Unconstrained First Best Equilibrium
In the previous section we showed that there exist a tax scheme that can implement the
social planner allocation. Here we rst characterize the unconstrained equilibrium (i.e. the
rst best) and then we show how the same set of taxes that implement the social planner
allocation, can also replicate the unconstrained rst best when set optimally by a Ramsey
planner.
We dene the rst best for our small open, economy as the unconstrained allocation in
which households and rms maximize utility and prots subject to budget and technolog-
ical constraints.11 Let us use the superscript FBto denote the rst-best unconstrained
optimal allocation. Then we can rewrite the rst order conditions of the household (7),
(10), (9) as  
CFBt  
 
HFBt


! 
!CFBt
CT;FBt
 1

= FBt (23)
Bt+1 : 
FB
t =  (1 + i)Et

FBt+1

; (24)
PN;FBt =
 
1  !
!
CT;FBt
CN;FBt
! 1

; (25)
(HFBt )
 1 =

!CFBt
CT;FBt
 1

W FBt : (26)
11We note here that there are still ine¢ cient variations in consumption due to lack of state contingent
debt.
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From the rmsmaximization problem we obtain
PN;FBt =
 
1  T ATt HT;FBt  T
(1  N)ANt

HN;FBt
 N ; (27)
W FBt = (1  N)PN;FBt ANt (HN;FBt ) 
N
: (28)
The following proposition shows that there exists a di¤erent, optimal schedule for the same
set of taxes that can replicate the rst best.
Proposition 2. Let Nt  Nt where Nt >  1 such as PN;CEt = 11+Nt P
N;FB
t solves the
following borrowing constraint equation (if there is no solution then let Nt =1)
BFBt+1 +
1  


ATt (H
T;FB
t )
1 T +
1
1 + Nt
PN;FBt C
N;FB
t

= 0;
and let Dt = 
N
t . Then this pair of tax policy rules replicates the rst best unconstrained
optimal in the competitive equilibrium solution. These tax rules are also time-consistent
optimal policy rules.
Proof. We only need to check that the rst best solution satises all the equilibrium con-
ditions. From the latter specication along with the relative price condition (9) and the
wage equation (11), the competitive equilibrium solution satises
Wt = (1  Dt )
 
1  NPNt ANt  HNt  N
= (1  N)

1  !
!
CTt
CNt
 1

ANt (H
N
t )
 N
since the 2 taxes cancel out each other. Note this wage equation recovers the wage in the
rst best unconstrained solution, W FBt , if we use C
T;FB
t , C
N;FB
t , and H
N;FB
t in places of
CTt , C
N
t , and H
N
t . In addition, since the rst best solution does not make the borrowing
constraint binding under the current setting of Nt , the Lagrange multiplier t  0 under
the rst best solution. So the (10) and (7) hold under the rst best unconstrained solution.
Since these are the only conditions distorted by the taxes and the borrowing constraint, we
conclude that we achieve the rst best unconstrained solution via the tax schedule on Nt
and Dt .
Since the tax schedule achieves the rst best unconstrained optimal, the government
has no incentive to deviate from the schedule at any point of time. Therefore such tax
schedule is also a time consistent optimal policy. Q.E.D.
Corollary: There exists a combination of (Dt ; 
T
t ) that replicates the rst best uncon-
strained allocation and it is time-consistent.
Let the optimal non-tradable consumption tax be Nt . It is easy to see that if we set
1
1+Tt
= 1+Nt , we achieve the rst best unconstrained allocation and t  0 for all t. Now,
since the tax on tradable consumption a¤ects also the intertemporal allocation of resources,
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we need to show that the tax policy that replicates the unconstrained rst best equilibrium
is constant so that the intertemporal margin is not a¤ected. By comparing Euler equations
in both the unconstrained and the constrained competitive equilibrium, and using t  0,
it is su¢ cient to nd Tt so that
1
1 + Tt
=
Et
"
u0(CFBt+1)C
FB
CTt+1
1+Tt+1
#
Et[u0(CFBt+1)C
FB
CTt+1
]
(29)
and the international borrowing constraint is satised, in order for the competitive equilib-
rium to achieve the unconstrained rst-best allocation.
First note that a constant tax policy will satisfy (29). Secondly, by inspection of the
rst-best unconstrained allocation, we can see that the non-tradable price has a strictly
positive lower limit. Therefore there exists T such that the borrowing constraint is always
satised for any T > T . Thus, any constant tax policy of the form Tt  T > T is an
optimal policy such that the competitive equilibrium replicates the rst best unconstrained
allocation.
As in the previous proposition, such policy is time-consistent as there are no incentives
to deviate from it. QED.
From this analysis it follows that if we allow a Ramsey planner to choose the optimal
combination of taxes on tradable consumption and on non-tradable prots, it is possible to
replicate the rst best unconstrained equilibrium. In fact the Ramsey planner can undo the
borrowing constraint altogether by a¤ecting the key market price that enters it with the
consumption tax and use the other available policy tools to undo the distortions created
by the consumption taxes.
Three remarks are in order here. First, we note that (Dt ; 
T
t ) is the same set of policy
tools that we used to decentralize the social planner allocation. The key di¤erence is
that when used optimally, they undo the constraint altogether, while the social planner
was taking the borrowing constraint as given. Therefore nancial crises never occurs in
this equilibrium. This result implies that in the social planner allocation the combination
of taxes (Dt ; 
T
t ) is suboptimal. Based on these results, and in light of the fact that
Ramsey optimal policy is generally not time-consistent, below we shall advocate the use of
a Markov-Perfect optimal policy approach to the normative analysis of this class of models.
In practice, given the set of policy instrument selected, it is useful to follow an approach
to policy design that can attains all the welfare gains that are within reach of the policy
instruments selected.
Second, our combination of policy tools requires a commitment to a certain tax schedules
when the economy enters a crisis state. However, since in the rst best unconstrained
equilibrium crises cease to occur, this is just a promise to intervene in the case of a nancial
crisis, rather than an actual intervention like in the case of the social planner allocation
in which crisis continue to occur. Moreover, since the promised interventions are time-
consistent, such a commitment is fully credible. In contrast, the implementation of the
social planner allocation with the same taxes requires that they are actually used when the
constraint binds. And this may rise traditional feasibility issues.
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Third and nally, like in the case of the implementation of the social planner allocation,
the tax schedules that replicate the rst best do not rely a the tax on debt, B, or any other
actual ex ante policy intervention. As we shall see below, however, once we limit the set
of available tools in such a way that the rst best cannot be reached, optimal policy will
contain precautionary components every time that the instruments assigned to the policy
maker cannot address the crisis e¤ectively.
4 Solution Methods
In this section we describe the global solution methods that we use to compute the equilibria
that we consider. We will present results for three di¤erent equilibria in section 4. The rst
is the competitive equilibrium of the model where there is no intervention on the part of
the government. The second is the social planner equilibrium that is the benchmark used
in the related literature. The third is a Markov-Perfect optimal policy equilibrium that is
time-consistent.12 The competitive and social planner solution algorithms are those used
by Benigno at al. 2012) so here we simply summarize them. The algorithm for the solution
of the Markov-Perfect optimal policy problem is a novel contribution of this paper, and we
provide more details.
We focus on Markov-Perfect optimal policy, which is time-consistent, because it is more
relevant for policymakers lacking credible commitment devices as the massive policy in-
terventions during the global nancial crisis have shown.13 In fact, the tax schedules that
we discussed in the previous section to implement the social planner allocation or the rst
best allocation are time-consistent. But as we shall see below, in general, Ramsey optimal
policy in this class of models is time-inconsistent.
4.1 Competitive Equilibrium and Social Planner Solutions
As in Benigno et al. (2012) the algorithm for the solution of the competitive equilibrium is
derived from Baxter (1990) and Coleman (1991), and involves iterating on the functional
equations that characterize a recursive competitive equilibrium in the states
 
Bt; A
T
t

. The
key step is to transform the complementary slackness conditions on the borrowing constraint
into a set of nonlinear equations that can be solved using standard methods (in particular, a
modied Powells method). In particular, the expressionmax ft ; 0g2 replaces the Lagrange
multiplier t (so that that max f t ; 0g2 = 0 if the constraint binds and t > 0) while the
single nonlinear equation
max f t ; 0g2 = Bt+1 +
1  '
'

ATt
 
HTt
1 T + PNt AN  HNt 1 N :
12While the tax schedules that we discussed in the previous section, that implement the social planner
allocation or the rst best allocation, are time-consistent in general optimal policy in this class of models
is time-incosistent. Here we shall focus on Markov-Perfect optimal policy which is time-consistent.
13As Chari and Kehoe (2009) noted, discretion is a more realistic description than commitmentof
the incentives faced by actual policy makers in this model environment.
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replaces the set of complementary slackness conditions:
t  0
Bt+1 +
1  '
'

ATt
 
HTt
1 T + PNt A  HNt 1 N  0
t

Bt+1 +
1  '
'

ATt
 
HTt
1 T + PNt A  HNt 1 N = 0:
Now, dene
t+1 = Et

t+1

the expected value of the marginal utility of tradable consumption; then x a grid for B,
guess a function t+1 = G
 
Bt+1; A
T
t

, and solve for

t ; t; Bt+1; C
T
t ; C
N
t ; H
T
t ; H
N
t ; P
N
t
	
at
each value of
 
Bt; A
T
t

. To evaluate G at values of Bt+1 that are not on the grid for B we
parametrize G using a cubic spline and solve the resulting system of nonlinear equations
with a standard solver. The solution for t is then used to update the G function to
convergence.14 Given the solution for the equilibrium decision rules, we can compute the
equilibrium value of the lifetime utility by solving the functional equation
V
 
Bt; A
T
t

=
1
1  

Ct   1

(Ht)

1 
+ E

V
 
Bt+1; A
T
t+1
 jATt  ;
which denes a contraction mapping and thus has a unique solution.15
For the social planner equilibrium, following Benigno et al. (2012), we solve a standard
dynamic programming problem with Bellman equation
V SP
 
Bt; A
T
t

= max
CTt ;C
N
t ;H
T
t ;H
N
t ;Bt+1;P
N
t
(
1
1  

Ct   1

(Ht)

1 
+ E

V SP
 
Bt+1; A
T
t+1
 jATt 
)
subject to the resource constraints, the borrowing constraint, the denition of Ct, and the
equation that determines PN :
CTt = (1 + r)Bt + A
T
t
 
HTt
1 T  Bt+1 and CNt = AN  HNt 1 N
Bt+1   1  '
'

ATt
 
HTt
1 T + PNt AN  HNt 1 N
PNt =

1  !
!
 1


CNt
CTt
  1

:
Again we again parametrize the function V SP using a cubic spline to evaluate it at values
of Bt+1 that are not on the grid for B, and solve the maximization problem using feasible
sequential quadratic programming.
14Note also that t = max ft ; 0g2  0, max f t ; 0g2  0, and max ft ; 0g2max f t ; 0g2 = 0 so the
complementary slackness conditions are satised.
15This functional equation gives us lifetime utility only in equilibrium. To obtain lifetime utility outside
equilibrium, we would need to solve the household problem separating individual debt b from aggregate
debt B; a calculation that is straightforward to do.
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4.2 Markov-Perfect Optimal Policy Solution
In section 5 below, we report Markov-Perfect optimal policy (or optimal policy for brevity)
for several alternative sets of taxes. In general, we shall focus on optimal policy for cases
in which the set of policy tools is constrained in an arbitrary way so that it is not possible
to replicate the rst best unconstrained equilibrium. We note here that Ramsey optimal
policy in this class of models can be time-inconsistent, even though the tax schedules that
we discussed in the previous section, which can implement the social planner allocation
or the rst best allocation, are time-consistent. For this reason, in the numerical optimal
policy analysis we shall focus on Markov-Perfect equilibria which are time-consistent.16
The optimal policy solution algorithm is always the same. So here we explain only
the solution for the case in which the Ramsey planner has two specic instruments as an
example, a tax on debt and a tax on non-tradable consumption. Optimal policy with
one of these two instruments simply sets to zero the other instrument in all equations
below. Optimal policy with other sets of instruments simply uses di¤erent model equations
correspondingly modied.
While the presentation in this section is model-specic, the optimal policy solution
algorithm can be applied in a wider set of cases for models in which the credit constraint
is occasionally binding.
Broadly speaking, an optimal policy is a state contingent tax plan that maximizes the
lifetime utility of the representative agent. Thus, the optimization problem of the current
government is given by
V OP
 
Bt; A
T
t

= max
xt

1
1  
 
Ct    1Ht
1 
+ E

V OP
 
Bt+1; A
T
t
 jATt  (30)
subject to
CTt = (1 +R)Bt + A
T
t
 
HTt
1 T  Bt+1 (31)
CNt = A
N
 
HNt
1 N (32) 
1  Bt

t =  (1 +R)G
 
Bt+1; A
T
t+1

+max ft ; 0g2 (33)
t =

Ct    1 (Ht)
 
C 1t !
1

 
CTt
  1
 (34)
PNt =

1  !
!
 1


CNt
CTt
  1
 1
1 + Nt
(35)
Ct    1 (Ht)
 
(Ht)
 1 = PNt (1  N)AN
 
HNt
 N t + 1  '' max ft ; 0g2

(36)
PNt (1  N)AN
 
HNt
 N = ATt (1  T )  HTt  T (37)
max f t ; 0g2 = Bt+1 +
1  '
'

ATt
 
HTt
1 T + PNt AN  HNt 1 N (38)
 Bt Bt+1 + Nt PNt CNt + Tt = 0; (39)
16As Chari and Kehoe (2009) noted, discretion is a more realistic description than commitmentof
the incentives faced by actual policy makers in this model environment.
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where xt =

Bt ; 
N
t ; C
T
t ; C
N
t ; H
T
t ; H
N
t ; P
N
t ; 

t ; t
	  
Bt; A
T
t

. These constraints are the
complete set of conditions describing the competitive equilibrium of the model.
A formal denition of a Markov-Perfect Ramsey optimal policy equilibrium can now be
stated. To simplify such denition, lets rst redene the competitive equilibrium.
Denition 1. A recursive competitive equilibrium, given the government policy functions 
N ; B; T
  
B;AT

, is an equilibrium value function V OP
 
B;AT

and a set of equilibrium
functions
 
CT ; CN ; HT ; HN ; B0; PN ; ; ; T
  
B;AT

such that
1.
 
CT ; CN ; HT ; HN ; B0; PN ; ; ; T
  
B;AT

solve equations (31)-(39) and
2. V OP
 
B;AT

solves
V OP
 
B;AT

=
1
1  

C
 
B;AT
   1  HT  B;AT +HN  B;AT 1  +(40)
E

V OP
 
B0
 
B;AT

; AT 0
 jAT  (41)
given
 
CT ; CN ; HT ; HN ; B0; PN ; ; 
  
B;AT

.
Denition 2. AMarkov-Perfect optimal policy equilibrium is a recursive competitive
equilibrium as dened above in which
 
N ; B; T
  
B;AT

satises
 
N ; B
  
B;AT
 2 argmax
N ;B ;T
(
1
1 

C
 
B;AT
   1  HT  B;AT +HN  B;AT 1 +
E

V OP
 
B0
 
B;AT

; AT 0
 jAT 
)
(42)
given
 
CT ; CN ; HT ; HN ; B0; PN ; ; ; V OP
  
B;AT

.
Two remarks are in order here. First, this denition corresponds to the compact
equilibrium denition of Krusell (2002) and Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2009) that is,
it does not explicitly write the competitive equilibrium prices and quantities as a function
of the government policy tools. As a result, the objective function depends on the policy
instruments only implicitly through the set of constraints on the problem. In a more explicit
denition of the equilibrium the tax instruments would be arguments of the endogenous
variables (such as for instance CT
 
B;AT ; N ; B; T

). Then one would specify that the
taxes are chosen so as to maximize household utility, so that for example  i =  i
 
B;AT

;
substitution then yields CT
 
B;AT ;  N
 
B;AT

;  B
 
B;AT

; T
 
B;AT

. Here we adopted
a compact equilibrium denition for ease of notation without any loss of generality and
without imposing any particular restriction on our problem.
Second, there is an important issue of commitment (time inconsistency) versus discre-
tion. Time inconsistency arises whenever future governments may want to choose di¤erent
optimal policies than the ones chosen today (or in the past). In our set up, the incentive
to deviate tomorrow from the optimal policy chosen today arises because the constraints
faced by tomorrows government may change if the borrowing limits binds. A way to see
how a time inconsistency problem arises in our set up is to look at the government decision
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problem at time t   1, when the Euler equation is one of the constraint on our optimal
policy problem and it involves a decision variable at time t, namely t:
t 1(1  B) =  (1 +R)Et 1 [t] + t 1:
Under commitment, this constraint represents a promise regarding the value of the marginal
utility of tradable consumption at time t, t. Under discretion, the government chooses t
at time t without taking such promise into account; that is, the implicit promise made at
time t   1 regarding marginal utility at time t might not be respected. This means that
government decisions at time t need not to internalize how they a¤ect t 1. As a result,
the optimal plans under commitment will generally di¤er from those under discretion in
our model set.17
The computational algorithm we set up is based on backward iteration and in practice
consists of three steps. First, we guess the value function V OP;0
 
B;AT

and the marginal
utility function 0
 
B;AT

. Second, we solve an optimization step to nd government
taxes and the corresponding resource allocations by the agent. Third, we update the value
function given the results of the optimization step. The last two steps are iterated till
convergence. Thus:
1. Guess V OP;0
 
B;AT

and 0
 
B;AT

, and compute
GV
 
B0:AT

= E

V OP;0
 
B0; AT 0
 jAT 
G
 
B0; AT

= E

0
 
B0; AT 0
 jAT  :
2. Solve the constrained maximization problem for
 
N ; B; CT ; CN ; B0; ; ; PN ; HT ; HN ; T

as functions of
 
B;AT

. In this step we impose nonnegativity constraints on those
variables that require them (consumption, labor supply, and prices). The constraint
that the argument of the utility function is positive is imposed as well:
!
1

 
CT
 1
 + (1  !) 1  CN 1   1    1  HT +HN > 0:
3. Finally, update the value function using
V OP;1
 
B;AT

=
1
1  

C
 
B;AT
   1  HT  B;AT +HN  B;AT 1  +
GV
 
B0
 
B;AT

:AT

and 1
 
B;AT

; and repeat to convergence.
17Another way to see the same issue is the following. Marcet and Marimon (2009) show how to construct
a state space in which the commitment problem remains recursive by adding past multipliers as state
variables. Our assumption here is that the state space
 
Bt; A
T
t

limits the set of variables that the current
government assumes the future government will take into account in its decisions. That is, we rule out
trigger-strategy equilibria (see Bernheim, Ray, and Yeltekin 1999).
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Our algorithm locates an innite-horizon equilibrium (if it exists) that is the limit of
a sequence of nite-horizon equilibria, but nothing guarantees that it is unique. Since the
operator dened above is not a contraction mapping, nor guaranteed to be monotone, there
are no known conditions under which it converges; indeed, it does not converge for some
parameter values and from some initial conditions (in general we use the value function for
the competitive equilibrium as an initial condition, which technically means we are assuming
that the government at the end of timewill impose no taxes). However, in every case
in which it converged for a given set of parameter values, it always converged to the same
equilibrium. In addition, we found no evidence of multiple solutions to the optimization
problem above. As an aside, smooth equilibria of the sort considered by Klein, Krusell, and
Ríos-Rull (2009) do not exist in this class of models, because the policy functions are not
di¤erentiable at the point where the constraint binds exactly (that is, where 
 
B;AT

= 0
in our model).
4.3 Welfare Measure
In section 5 we will rank equilibria under alternative optimal policies by calculating the
welfare gain relative to the competitive equilibrium associated with that policy. As usual,
welfare is quantied as the percent of consumption that the representative agent is willing to
pay at every date and state to move from one equilibrium to the other. In our environment,
this quantity is constructed by calculating the welfare gain at each state. The state specic
gains are then aggregated using the unconditional probability of being in each state. This
measure takes into account the e¤ects of any transitional dynamics associated with the
fact that the ergodic distributions for the competitive equilibrium and the di¤erent policy
equilibria may not have the same support.18
Let V SP
 
Bt; A
T
t

denote lifetime utility in the social planning or an optimal policy
allocation. We rst solve the dynamic functional equation
v
 
Bt; A
T
t ;

=
1
1  

Ct    1 (Ht)
1 
+ E

v
 
Bt+1; A
T
t+1;
 jATt 
where v
 
Bt; A
T
t ;

is the lifetime utility obtained from evaluating the competitive equi-
librium decision rules with an extra  percent of tradable consumption given freely to the
representative household.19 This functional equation denes a contraction mapping, so it
has a unique solution. From the solution of this problem, we can compute the solution to
the nonlinear equation
V SP
 
Bt; A
T
t

= v
 
Bt; A
T
t ;
 
Bt; A
T
t

;
which yields the percent increase in tradable consumption that, state-by-state, renders the
representative agent indi¤erent between the competitive equilibrium and the social planner,
or any particular optimal policy allocation computed.
18Welfare gain and losses are computed as a percentage of tradable consumption. The ranking of the
allocations would not change if we were to express welfare gains and losses as a percentage of overall
consumption.
19Note that the household is not maximizing utility using these decision rules once the extra  percent
of tradable consumption is endowed.
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4.4 Equivalence of Alternative Taxes in a Markov Perfect Equi-
librium
We now discuss some properties of alternative taxes that are useful in order interpret our
numerical results for the case in which the set of policy tools is constrained. It is important
to remember here that we are focusing on time-consistent equilibria in which decisions at
time t are taken as given from the perspective of time t  1: So the results below about the
equivalence of alternative tax instruments hold in the Markov-Perfect Equilibria that we
compute, but might not hold in a commitment equilibrium. To do so, we rst analyze how
the presence of the borrowing constraint distorts the di¤erent margins of the competitive
equilibrium allocation. Once the margins are identied, we will examine how alternative
taxes can be used to improve upon the competitive equilibrium allocation.
If we combine (18) and (19) from the social planner problem, we obtain:
SP2;t
SP1;t
=

(1  !)CT
!CN
 1

0@1  SPt
SP1;t 
1  

(1  !)
!
 
(1  !)  CTt 
!CN
! 1 

1A ;
which is the condition that governs the intratemporal allocation of consumption between
tradables and nontradables in the social planner equilibrium. Note here that this condition
is distorted when the constraint binds and implies a lower marginal utility of nontradables
consumption compared to the equivalent condition that would arise in the competitive
equilibrium with taxes:
PNt =

(1  !)CT
!CN
 1
 1
(1 + Nt )
:
From this comparison it follows that we can o¤set the distortion caused by the borrowing
constraint on the intratemporal consumption allocation by using Nt to equalize the two
margins. To do so we can set the tax as follows:
1
(1 + Nt )
=
0@1  SPt
SP1;t 
1  

(1  !)
!
 
(1  !)  CTt 
!CN
! 1 

1A < 1;
which implies Nt > 0. From this expression, it is immediate to see that a tax on tradables
consumption would operate similarly to a nontradable consumption tax. This implies that
in the Markov-Perfect Ramsey optimal policy equilibrium that we will compute below, a tax
on tradable consumption (T ), a tax on nontradable consumption (N) or a combination
of the two (T ; N) generates the exactly same allocation.
We now examine how a binding borrowing limit distorts the labor supply decision. From
(21) and (22) we obtain
Ct   H

t

   
H 1t

=
 
1  T SP1;t ATt H Tt 1 + 1   SPtSP1;t

;
where
SPt = 
SP
t    (1 + i)Et

SPt+1

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While in the competitive equilibrium allocation we have 
Cj;t  
Hj;t

!   
H 1j;t

=
 
1  T ATt  HTt  T CEt 1 + 1   CEtCEt

:
where
CEt = (1  Bt )CEt    (1 + i)Et

CEt+1

:
First note here that when the constraint binds (CEt > 0), 
B
t inuences the labor supply
by altering the value of the multiplier CEt . In fact, for given exogenous states, when the
constraint binds, the amount that can be borrowed is not a¤ected by B. In this sense,
when the constraint binds, Bt operates like a tax on wages (i.e., 
L) since both instruments
a¤ect the same margin, i.e. the household labor supply decision.20 A similar argument holds
for the case in which the constraint does not bind since in a time-consistent equilibrium the
Ramsey planner takes Et

t+1

as given. This implies that in our Markov-perfect optimal
policy equilibrium B, L or a combination of the two (B; L) would also generate the
same allocation.
5 Parameter Values
The model is calibrated at quarterly frequency on Mexican data. There are several reasons
to focus on Mexico. First Mexico is an advanced emerging market economy whose experi-
ence is particularly relevant for the main issue addressed in the paper. Mexico experienced
three major nancial crises since 1980: the 1982 debt crisis; the well known "Tequila crisis"
in 1994-1995; and the third one in 2008-09, during the global nancial crisis, perhaps less se-
vere than the previous two but nonetheless leading Mexico to seek (or accept) IMF nancial
assistance. Second, Mexico is a well functioning, relatively large, market-based economy
in which production in both the tradable and non-tradable sectors of the economy goes
well beyond the extraction of natural resources such as oil or other commodities. Indeed,
Mexico is an OECD economy whose experience is relevant also for the advanced economies
struggling with nancial crises like those in the euro zone. Third and nally, there is a
substantial body of previous quantitative work on Mexico, starting from Mendoza (1991),
which greatly facilitates the choice of the parameter values of the model. In particular,
we choose model parameters following the work of Mendoza (2002, 2010) and Kehoe and
Ruhl (2008) to the extent possible, and use available data where necessary to complement
or update their choices.
The specic set of parameter values that we use are reported in Table 1. We note here
that in our calibration of the competitive allocation we set all the distorting policy tools
to zero. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is set to standard value of  = 2, like
20A tax on wages would alter only the labor supply margin in the competitive equilibrium as 
Cj;t  
Hj;t

!   
H 1j;t

= (1  L)  1  T ATt  HTt  T CEt
 
1 +
1  

CEt
CEt
!
:
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in Mendoza (2002, 2010). We set then the world interest rate to i = 0:01587, which yields
an annual real rate of interest of about 6.5 percent like in Mendoza (2002): a value that is
between the 5 percent of Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) and the 8.6 percent of Mendoza (2010).
The elasticity of intratemporal substitution in consumption between tradables and non-
tradables is an important parameter in the analysis. But there is a good degree of consensus
in the literature on its value. We follow Ostry and Reinhart (1992), who estimates a value
of  = 0:760 for developing countries. This is a conservative assumption compared to
the value of 0:5 used by Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) that is closer to the one assumed for an
advanced, more closed economy like the United States.
Estimates of the wage elasticity of labor supply in Mexico are uncertain at best (Men-
doza, 2002 and 2010). We set the value of  = 1:75, close to the value of 1:84 adopted by
Mendoza (2010). The labor share of income, (1   T ) and (1   N) is set to 0.66 in both
tradable and non tradable sectors: a standard value, close to that used by Mendoza (2002),
and consistent with empirical evidence on the aggregate share of labor income in GDP in
household survey of Garcia-Verdu (2005).
The shock to tradable total factor productivity specied as
log
 
ATt

= A log
 
ATt 1

+ "t;
where "t is an iid N(0; 2A) innovation. The parameters of this process are set to A = 0:537
and A = 0:0134, which are the rst autocorrelation and the standard deviation of aggregate
total factor productivity reported by Mendoza (2010). Both the average value of AT and
the constant AN are set to one.
The remaining three model parameters the share of tradable consumption in the con-
sumption basket (!), the credit constraint parameter (), and the discount factor () are
set by iterating on a routine that minimizes the sum of squared di¤erences between the
moments in the ergodic distribution of the competitive equilibrium of the model and three
data targets. The data targets are a CN=CT ratio of 1.643, a 35 percent debt-to-GDP ra-
tio, and an unconditional probability of capital ow reversal of 2 percent per quarter. The
targeted CN=CT ratio is the value implied by the following ratios estimated by Mendoza
(2002): Y T=Y N =0.648, CT=Y T =0.665; and CN=Y N =0.708.21 The debt-to-GDP target
is Mexicos average net foreign asset to annual GDP ratio, from 1970 to 2008, in an updated
version of the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) data set.
The target for the unconditional probability of capital ow reversal is more di¢ cult
to pin down. Despite a signicant body of empirical work, there is no consensus in the
literature on how to dene nancial crises empirically, and hence no accepted measure
of their unconditional probability. By focusing on Mexico, we can pin down this target
simply and unambiguously, measuring it as the relative frequency, on a quarterly basis, of
Mexicos crisis years over the period 1975-2010. This assumes that, as generally accepted,
1982, 1995, and 2009 were crisis years for Mexico. The resulting 2 percent is very close to
the 1.9 percent implied by the empirical analysis of Jeanne and Ranciere (2010) over the
period 1975-2003, who use an absolutedenition of crisis as a current account reversals
larger than 5 percent of GDP. Our choice is also similar to the 2.2 percent value implied by
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejía (2008) for the period 1990-2004, based on a relativedenition
21Ratios computed with updated data are essentially the same.
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of nancial crisis as current account reversals larger than two standard deviations. The two
percent value, however, is at the low-end of the range of values estimated in these studies
by pooling data for the whole sample of emerging markets considered.
In order to compute the frequency of nancial crisis in the ergodic distribution of the
model consistent with the empirical literature above we dene it as an event in which :
(a) t > 0 (i.e. the international borrowing constraint is binding) and (b) (Bt+1   Bt) >
2(Bt+1   Bt) (i.e. the current account or changes in the net foreign asset position in a
given period exceed two times its standard deviation). The rst criterion is a purely model
based denition of crisis. The second criterion allows us to consider only model events in
which there are large current account reversals, in line with the aforementioned empirical
literature.22 23
With the targets above we obtain ! = 0:3526;  = 0:9717, and  = 0:415. The implied
value of ! is slightly higher than in Mendoza (2002) and slightly lower than assumed by
Kehoe and Ruhl (2008). The implied annual value of  yields an annual discount factor of
0:8915, only slightly lower than in Kehoe and Ruhl (2008).24 The implied value of  is lower
than in Mendoza (2002), who however calibrates it to the deterministic steady state of the
model, and there are no standard benchmarks for this model parameter in the literature.
The quantitative performance of the model from a positive perspective is discussed at
length in Benigno et al. (2012), where we emphasize its virtues and limits. In particular
one of the main drawback of our model is that it implies a counterfactual increase of labor
when the constraint binds. As we noted earlier, however, introducing a working capital
constraint would help in this direction but would not alter the normative analysis which is
the focus of this paper.
6 Optimal Policy
In this section we compute optimal policy for our economy when the set of instruments
available limits the possibility of replicating the unconstrained equilibrium. As we outlined
in the previous section we compute Markov-Perfect optimal policy for alternative policy
tools. We rst examine a two instrument case and then consider a set of optimal policy
problems in which the policy maker has access to one instrument only. The two instruments
that we consider in the baseline case are a tax on non-tradable consumption, Nt (i.e.,
exchange rate policy), and a tax on debt, Bt (i.e., a direct control on capital ows). We
then also report results for a tax on wage income L and a tax on tradable consumption
22The denition of nancial crisis typically used in the empirical literature focuses on large capital ows
reversals because some smaller ones may be due to terms of trade changes or other factors Jeanne and
Rancière (2010), for instance, excludes commodity importers and oil producers, while Calvo Izquierdo, and
Mejía (2008) add other criteria to the second denition we use above.
23Note that balance of payment data may have trends, and hence the empirical literature focuses on
changes in the current account, or the rst di¤erence of the capital ows. As our model has no trend
growth, we focus on the current account rather than its change. We obtain similar results when we dene
the sudden stop with respect to changes in the current account.
24This value is not comparable to the one assumed by Mendoza (2002) as he uses an elastic discount factor
specication. In our model, the presence of the borrowing constraint removes the necessity to introduce
any device to induce a stationary ergodic distribution of foreign borrowing.
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T .
6.1 Two Instruments
Figure 1 reports the decision rules for Nt and 
B
t (where a positive value is a tax and a
negative value is a subsidy), as well as the decision rule for the lump sum transfer, Tt, when
the policy maker can use the two tax policy instruments simultaneously. These functions
are plotted for the average value of the tradable productivity shock AT , but qualitatively
they do not change in response to changes in AT (instead they simply shift up and down).
Figure 1 also reports the decision rules for borrowing (Bt+1), the marginal utility of tradable
consumption (t), and the Lagrange multiplier on the collateral constraint (t). Figure 2
reports the decision rules for the relative price of non tradable (PNt ), total labor supply (Ht),
and sector labor allocation (HTt and H
N
t , respectively). Figure 3 reports the decision rules
for the real wage (Wt), total consumption (Ct), and tradable and non tradable consumption
respectively (CNt ; C
T
t ). In addition to the decision rules for the optimal policy allocation,
denoted OP(Nt ,
B
t ), we also report the rules for the social planner allocation (SP) and the
competitive equilibrium allocation (CE) in which all taxes are set equal to zero.
The optimal policy rules for Nt and 
B
t are highly non-linear. If the policy maker has
access to both a consumption tax and a tax on debt as instruments, the optimal intervention
is no intervention before the constraint binds and a tax on debt combined with a subsidy on
non-tradable consumption when the constraint binds (Figure 1). Thus, in states of the world
in which the constraint is not binding the optimal policy is passive, i.e., Nt = 
B
t = 0. In
states of the world in which the constraint is binding, the optimal policy is activewith a
subsidy to non-tradable consumption and a tax on borrowing. Interestingly, the lump sum
transfer is always zero.
When the constraint binds, as we saw in Sections 2 and 3, subsidizing non-tradable
consumption increases the demand of non-tradable goods (even more than in the CE) and
reduces it in the tradable sector (even more than in the SP) (Figure 2). The relative
price of nontradable increases (but not as much as in the SP) increasing the value of the
collateral and hence borrowing (Figure 2 and 1). When the constraint binds, since the
amount of borrowing is determined by the endogenous limit, taxing debt a¤ects the labor
supply margin and tends to decrease the amount of labor that is supplied in crisis times
for given real wages (10).
The resource allocation under optimal policy is not only quantitatively but also quali-
tatively di¤erent than the social planner one. Labor in the OP(Nt ,
B
t ) allocation is higher
than in the CE allocation in the non-tradable sector and lower than in the CE in the
tradable sector. In contrast, in the SP allocation, in which total labor is lower than in
the OP(Nt ,
B
t ) allocation, labor is lower than in the CE both in the tradable and the
non-tradable sector. As a result, the relative price of non-tradable, the real wage, total
consumption, and tradable consumption are higher in the SP than both the CE and the
OP(Nt ,
B
t ) allocation. Non tradable consumption, instead, is lower in the SP allocation
than both in the CE and the OP(Nt ,
B
t ) allocation.
When the constraint does not bind the optimal policy is no policy action. To un-
derstand this result, it is helpful to preview the results for the one instrument case below.
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In that situation, the government acts before the constraint binds (i.e., in states in which
the constraint does not bind today but may bind with positive probability tomorrow). In
that case, the government uses the only tool it has available to reduce the crisis frequency
because it cannot e¤ectively mitigate the costs associated with the use of distortionary
policy tools during the crisis if one does occur.
In contrast, with two instruments the government could limit these costs. Specically, by
subsidizing nontradable consumption with Nt the government a¤ects the marginal product
of labor in the non-tradable sector (see (11)) and decreases the demand for non-tradable
labor for any given wage. The government then mitigates this e¤ect by decreasing the
total supply of labor through an increase in B: Given the set of tools available, therefore,
there is no need to distort the allocation today to ameliorate the allocation tomorrow even
when there is a positive probability that the constraint binds tomorrow; in e¤ect, the
government today understands that the government tomorrow will act in the event of a
crisis and therefore does not need to distort the economy today (when the constraint is not
binding).25
As in the SP allocation, the OP(Nt ,
B
t ) allocation displays more borrowing and a lower
probability of a crisis than the CE allocation. Table 2 reports the ergodic mean of debt
in units of tradable consumption. It shows that average borrowing under OP(Nt ,
B
t ) is
more than in the CE allocation but less than in the SP allocation. This is consistent with
the plot of the decision rules in Figure 1. Table 3 reports the unconditional probability
of a nancial crisis. Under OP(Nt ,
B
t ), the probability of crisis is lower than in the SP
allocation and is close to zero. This suggests that what matters is not necessarily limiting
the probability of a crisis but allocating resources more e¢ ciently as in the SP allocation.
Welfare is higher under OP(Nt ,
B
t ) than in the CE. Nonetheless, OP(
N
t ,
B
t ) achieves
only a fraction of the welfare gains in the SP. Table 4, which reports the welfare gain for
all the alternative policy regimes considered compared to the CE equilibrium, shows this.
Indeed, Table 4 shows that the welfare gains from OP(Nt ,
B
t ) are one order of magnitude
smaller than those in the SP. Note however here that even the welfare gains under SP are
very small, consistent with the nding of the rest of the literature.
Consider now optimal policy under alternative pairs of policy instruments. We allow for
a tax on wage income, L, as well as a tax on tradable consumption, T , and we consider
the following possible combination of taxes: OP(T ; B), OP(N ; L), OP(T ; L), and
OP(L; B). Figure 4 reports the decision rules for alternative pairs of policy instruments
and the corresponding lump sun transfers, while Figure 5 reports key variables of the
corresponding allocations.
When we use alternative pairs of two policy instruments we nd that, consistently with
the results in Section 4.4, the following allocations coincide exactly, except for the behav-
ior of the lump sum transfer: OP(N ; B)=OP(T ; B)=OP(N ; L)=OP(T ; L). These
equivalences hold because, as shown in section 4.4, the tax on tradable and non-tradable
consumption operates on the same margin, and the tax on debt and the wage tax operate
on the labor margin in the same way when the constraint binds.
25Note here that the OP(Nt ,
B
t ) allocation remains distant from the SP one. Indeed, as we showed in
section 3, it is not possible to achieve the SP with these two specic instruments. OP(Nt ,
B
t ) however
satises (42).
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Finally note that, consistent with the results in section 3, none of these combinations
of optimal policies replicates the social planner.
6.2 One Instrument
Consider now a set of optimal policy problems when the policy maker has access to one
instrument only. We consider all instruments discussed above, used one at a time: Nt
or Bt , 
T
t or 
L
t . Figure 6 reports the decision rules for 
N
t or 
B
t as well as the for the
corresponding lump sum transfer. The benchmark here is the optimal policy problem with
two instruments that we discussed above, OP(N ; B).
There is a key di¤erence relative to OP(N ; B). If the policy maker has only one
instrument, the optimal policy is always a tax before the constraint binds and a subsidy
while the constraint binds, regardless of the instrument used. Thus, the optimal Ramsey
policy continues to be non linear, but now has a precautionary component regardless of
the instrument used. These interventions can be interpreted as "leaning against the wind"
policies in normal times, either against the real exchange rate or debt, and "bail outs" in
crisis times, either in the domestic good market or the international capital market.
The reason for this qualitative di¤erence relative to optimal policy with two instru-
ments is the following. In our production economy, the ine¢ ciency caused by the pecuniary
externality distorts di¤erent private agentsdecisions. As we explained above, when the
constraint binds, if the policy maker has two instruments, it is optimal to tax debt and
subsidize non-tradable consumption. With one instrument only, when the constraint binds,
the policy maker faces bigger costs in the use of N and B respectively since it cannot
undo the costs associated with the use of one distortionary tool at a time As a consequence,
anticipating this trade o¤ in crisis states, she/he acts before the crisis in a way that lowers
the unconditional probability of a crisis happening in the rst place. With two instru-
ments, instead, the government can correct the allocation enough to remove the incentive
to intervene in a precautionary manner. That is, with two instruments, the welfare cost of
intervening ex ante is larger than the expected value of the gain stemming from entering a
crisis period with the allocation induced by such ex ante intervention.
Notwithstanding these similarities, there is an important di¤erence in the e¤ects and
the working of optimal policy with alternative instruments. Welfare gains with Nt or 
T
t are
one order of magnitude higher than with Bt or 
L
t even though the associated probability
of crisis is lower with Bt or 
L
t (Tables 3 and 4). Related to this, we can see that borrowing
(and hence tradable consumption that is not reported) is lower under OP(Bt ) than OP(
N
t )
(Table 3).
Finally, by comparing Figure 6 with Figure 1, we can see that the size of the tax
interventions, for both instruments, is much smaller with one instrument than in the case
in which there are two instruments. The reason is again is associated with the costs of using
one instrument at a time without the possibility of mitigating its consequences on agents
private decisions.
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7 Conclusions
In this paper we study optimal tax policy in a production economy in which a borrowing
constraint binds only occasionally and the nancial crisis is an endogenous event. We rst
show analytically that when the set of policy tools is unconstrained, the same combination
of policy instruments that can achieve the constrained e¢ cient allocation could be used
optimally by a Ramsey planner to replicate the unconstrained rst best equilibrium. We
then consider the more realistic case in which the set of policy tools is constrained, so that
the rst best cannot be achieved. To study this case we propose a numerical solution algo-
rithm that computes optimal Markov-Perfect policy in this environment where the policy
function is not di¤erentiable and available methods do not apply. In the numerical analysis
of our model, we nd that, if the government has two instruments (i.e., a consumption
tax and a tax on debt), it is optimal to intervene only during nancial crises and not to
intervene in normal times. In contrast, when the policy maker has only one policy tool,
we nd that the optimal policy has a precautionary component regardless of the specic
instruments used to intervene.
These results provides a novel rationale for macro-prudential policies. In fact, in broad
terms, our analysis suggests that the scope for preemptive policies depends on the e¤ective-
ness of crisis resolution policies and their interaction is crucial for the policy design problem.
The more e¤ective (ine¤ective) are ex post policies, there less signicant (important) is the
scope for ex ante policies. While most of the related literature has focused on the quantity
of debt as an indicator for policy intervention (by referring to credit booms or overborrow-
ing) , our analysis suggests that the allocation of resources might be more relevant than the
overall quantity of debt. As a consequence policy tools that help allocate resources more
e¢ ciently are more e¤ective than the ones aimed at limiting the total amount of available
borrowed resources.
One important questions raised by our analysis is whether optimal policy under commit-
ment may di¤er signicantly than under discretion, including in its prudential component.
We regard this as a fruitful area of future research.
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8 Appendix Alternative Set of Taxes to implement
Social Planner
Another way to decentralize the SP allocation is to use the following set of distortionary
taxes: a tax on tradable consumption, a tax on nontradable consumption, a tax on new debt,
a tax on labor income, and a tax on tradable output; the government budget constraint is
assumed to be satised via a lump-sum tax/transfer. In this world we have the following
conditions for a competitive equilibrium:
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Since 1;t = t (the marginal value of wealth is equalized) the expressions simplify:
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A lump-sum tax/transfer can then be used to balance the government budget constraint.
Note that the third and fourth equations can be used to dene
 
Dt ; 
N
t

entirely in terms of
Lt , so that solving the system of equations can be reduced to solving one nonlinear equation
in Lt : 
1  !
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The LHS of this equation is constant in terms of L and the rst term on the RHS is strictly
increasing in L, but the second term is strictly decreasing so no guarantee of uniqueness
can be obtained. However, at least one L < 1 exists that solves this equation, as the LHS
is strictly positive and the RHS can be made both negative (setting L < 0) and arbitrarily
positive (setting L close to 1).
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Table 1. Model Parameters
Structural parameters Values
Elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods  = 0:760
Intertemporal substitution and risk aversion  = 2
Labor supply elasticity  = 1:75
Credit constraint parameter  = 0:415
Labor share in production 1  T = 1  N = 0:66
Relative weight of tradable and non-tradable goods ! = 0:3526
Discount factor  = 0:9717
Exogenous variables Values
World real interest rate i = 0:01587
Steady state productivity level AN = AT = 1
Productivity process
Persistence "T = 0:5370
Volatility "T = 0:0134
Average values in the ergodic distribution Values
Net foreign assets (or minus foreign borrowing) B =  0:914
Qaurterly GDP Y = 0:6486
Qaurterly Tradable GDP Y T = 0:2544
Qaurterly Non-Tradable GDP Y N = 0:3942
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Table 2. Ergodic Mean of Debt
(In units of tradable consumption unless noted)
CE SP OP(N ; B) 1/ OP(N) 2/ OP(B) 3/
Bt+1  1:17  1:22  1:20  1:19  1:17
Table 3. Quarterly crisis probabilities
(In percent, unconditional)
CE SP OP(N ; B) 1/ OP(N) 2/ OP(B) 3/
1.96 1.63 0.09 0.60 0.00
Table 4. Welfare gain of moving from the CE
(In percent of permanent consumption)
Overall In crisis states
CE na na
SP 0:18% 0:22%
OP(N ;B) 1/ 0:04% 0:05%
OP(N) 2/ 0:02% 0:03%
OP(B) 3/ 0:003% 0:005%
1/ Allocation equivalent to OP(T ; B), OP(N ; H), and OP(T ; H)
2/ Allocation equivalent to OP(T )
3/ Allocation equivalent to OP(H ; B), and OP(H)
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Figure 1: Optimal Policy With Two Instruments
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Figure 2: Optimal Policy With Two Instruments
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Figure 3: Optimal Policy With Two Instruments
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Figure 4: Optimal Policy With Two Instruments
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Figure 5: Optimal Policy With Two Instruments
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Figure 6: Optimal Policy With One Instrument
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Figure 7: Optimal Policy With One Instrument
−1.3 −1.2 −1.1 −1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
Bt
PN t
Nontradable Price
 
 
OP(τB,τN)
OP(τB)
OP(τN)
−1.3 −1.2 −1.1 −1
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
Bt
H t
Total Labor
 
 
OP(τB,τN)
OP(τB)
OP(τN)
−1.3 −1.2 −1.1 −1
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
Bt
HT t
Tradable Labor
 
 
OP(τB,τN)
OP(τB)
OP(τN)
−1.3 −1.2 −1.1 −1
0.3
0.32
0.34
0.36
0.38
Bt
HN t
Nontradable Labor
 
 
OP(τB,τN)
OP(τB)
OP(τN)
8
Figure 8: Optimal Policy With One Instrument
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